



A FUTURE FOR DEMOCRACY A DEMOCRACY FOR WORLD GOVERNABILITY

M. Dolors Oller i Sala

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M. DOLORS OLLER I SALA is a professor of Constitutional Law at the Faculty of Abat Oliba

1. THE URGENCY OF A CHANGE OF COURSE

We live in an era of unprecedented transformations. Technological advances are being produced, as never before, at breakneck speed. What was good just a few years ago, seems to us of no use now. But one should remember that *globalisation is understood differently depending upon the individual, group or situation*. This process is to some most fascinating and they live the present with optimism trying to accommodate themselves in the new order and to exploit to the full the opportunities that are offered them; others find themselves out of place and disconcerted in the face of such rapid changes, looking distrustfully at the present which seems to turn everything upside down. Finally, there are those that contemplate the present and future with fear and look for safety props, trying to return to the past which no longer exists with the constant danger that their attitude could move them towards fundamentalist positions.

1.1. A new world...

Certainly, what we know as globalisation entails risks and opportunities. On the one hand, we are living an exceptional and privileged situation. Never before have we been able to be so conscious of the interrelation between different towns and cultures, thanks to technologies such as Internet which allow us to connect in a matter of seconds with the other end of the planet!

But if we contemplate our world in global fashion, what strikes our attention is *the lack of really important changes for humanity*: we continue to live in a world full of flagrant inequalities and, despite the greater production of wealth, this is increasingly found to be concentrated in fewer hands.

The fact is that we are creating in reality a world where *the greed of a few are leaving the majority in the ditch of history*; some societies while living lives of technological progress and unseen-before possibilities are manufacturing and reproducing exclusion for others. In this sense, then, the much-applauded globalisation presents itself to us more as myth than reality. More than a global world, we are in a world that continues to be strongly divided between those who enjoy the opportunities that globalisation brings along and those others

who remain on the margin of those opportunities. A world in which an infinite number of obstacles are placed to prevent the free movement of people from countries of the South towards those of the North, as we can unfortunately observe from the protection of boundaries resorted to by rich countries.

1.2. ...which is a world too old...

The new world order that is presented to us stems from the unification of markets to facilitate the circulation of money and goods. In short, *really speaking, only the logistics of financial markets have been globalised*. The absolutism of this capital is creating havoc. We can say it is *only the rich who are globalised*: Technology protects us while it separates us from the poor, who we keep subjugated and working for us because it is essential for the system to keep on having poor people in certain places of the world, necessary as it is for them to be kept from moving from those places in order to carry on producing cheap misery for the rich.

Injustice and inequality are distinctive signs of the current world. We are not moving towards a more just system, although the marketing policy of single thinking is presented to us this way: *globalisation is profoundly selective*. There have been no substantial changes in the social structure. The advantages of globalisation do nothing else than benefit those who have always been benefited and the same occurs with the share of wealth. The world is being globalised at the pace and in the way desired by big economic powers. And in part *a savage capitalism is returning* which history has already judged with severity when considering the capitalism that had subjugated the proletariat in the XVIII and XIX centuries. *In this way the historic successes of the Welfare State are being dismantled*, increasing thereby the differences between rich and poor. And whereas in the XX century the states had a leading role in the economic field, today on the contrary, their strength is lesser with each new day.

Diverse instances are reminding us of the necessity to put an end to this scandalous situation and to advance towards a *sustainable model*, humanising globalisation and converting it into an authentically universal promise and project¹. It is necessary to face the consequences of having turned the world into an enormous market and on account of this *we must build a new world - a world where there is place for all people*.

1.3. ...which needs a new policy...

A great part of the problems that we have pointed out are of a structural character and to face them structural solutions would also be necessary. And who could manage this is precisely politics with all its defects and possibilities.

What is also necessary is a *control of the process of globalisation by democratic means* in order to avoid the risk of social breakdowns fatal for the freedom of all. For this, at a time in which freedom for all is ceding ground to the market, we need urgently to revitalise it and keep in mind fundamental aspects such as *responsibility* and the *common good*. While helping to recover the political vocation as one of service, we need to regenerate democracy as the government of people. All this needs to be done since in the eyes of a great part of the population of consolidated democracies, democracy has become bureaucratised and is gradually losing much of its content. And this, simultaneously, implies the *reconstruction of*

the political subject, harmed by processes and dynamics that are radically opposed to the social implication and assumption of responsibilities in this order.

1.4. ...that is not a slave of the economy...

Because despite the supremacy of economy over politics, the idea must remain clear in our minds that *the globalising process is a process whose nature is fundamentally political*. It responds in the first place to the decisions taken by men and women with power and capacity of decision, who have opened the doors to an economic growth that does not imply a more equitable sharing of wealth, since it has fallen into the hands of the absolutism of financial capital. And with this procedure, *political power has become a captive of economy*.

On a world level *a new political order is emerging*. And this is provoking the *necessity of re-founding* on a more universalistic and less excluding key *the bases on which the present world political order is sustained*.

And we must remember that *if democracy is to take root and grow stronger it is necessary to have people who live democratic values*, who have been socialised in these values and who have reflected on them with assiduity. Because democracy is limited not simply to voting or to certain procedures to resolve conflicts but it is primarily a *civic disposition*. And it can only be born and consolidated from a *deep-down inner commitment to collectivity and the happiness of others*.

1.5. ...and a renovated citizenship

Undoubtedly all this is not easy. *Individualism* which invades very especially the western world and threatens to become a generalised feature has its roots in a type of economic system, the capitalist one, and in the values it promotes. These values have been the logic of *the market* and it is this logic that has gradually invaded all spheres.

This logic has created in us a very materialistic mentality. *Competition* makes us see others not as collaborators and on-the-way companions but as competitors and even enemies. We have built our societies on a *culture of violence*, that attempts to solve problems by force and assertiveness, and we do not know how to use dialogue and respect others who think differently from us.

Over a half century ago, Mounier stated “economic revolution will either be or not be spiritual”. Material liberation (social, economic) that is not founded on spiritual liberation is naïve, impossible and will end up contradicting itself. Spiritual liberation, on the other hand, if it is genuine and does not want to stop at simple evasion, will necessarily transform itself into social and economic liberation². On account of this an authentic “*cultural revolution*” is absolutely necessary – a revolution that can start new life-styles and which can help form a critical and participating public opinion.

And all this is not just pure fantasy but is quite possible, thanks to the globalising process. It is necessary, however, that *we ask ourselves what type of society we want to make a bid for*, with the conviction that a change of direction is possible and that it is possible to break with the *one-track thinking* that wishes everybody to see reality in just one single colour.

We need a revolution in values, one that will make us more human, teaching us to think of others and to do them justice, especially those “who are nobody”, since nobody has any need of them. A revolution that will lead us to feel that our destiny is tied to that of humanity. Thus we will recover the genuine identity and vocation of the human person that is built as such in relation with others. We need, finally, to go back to believing in the human being as such and in his capacity of behaving in an altruistic, generous and jointly-responsible way.

Though a few years ago we published a *Booklet* in which we analysed the *deficits* of our democracies³ and pointed out a set of steps which could strengthen these democracies, today we will deal again with the topic of democracy, led by the process of globalisation that is underway.

One thing is sure: the fact that *we cannot live democracy “from within doors” alone*; if the world is not structured and ruled essentially by democratic guidelines for the progress and development of nations, local democracy will not be viable. So, the challenge that we are presented with is *how to live democracy beyond our boundaries* – this is the condition of possibility for a democratic life in spheres nearer to us.

And this implies the contribution of the *new agents that have arisen on the international scene* and whose dynamics are transnational (regions, big metropolies, transnational companies, transnational NGOs, etc.).

2. GLOBALISATION, POLITICAL POWER AND DEMOCRACY

Globalisation affects all the different spheres of our life and, consequently, the political sphere too, which has been losing its leading role and capacity of real influence vis-à-vis the outburst of mercantile logic. We could say that politicians today live in the shadow of mercantile logic. Political power and the citizens' capacity of control and participation entailed in the democratic organisation of political power is retreating dangerously and what is gaining ground is economic power not organised under those parameters and which, nevertheless, has become international. In the last decades we have seen the emergence of new powers which are not subjected to democratic controls. This is the case of big financial and business corporations and mass media which operate on the margin of, and above, the democratic powers of states in a global space where no norms, laws and sanctions have yet been established.

1. THE CHALLENGE OF FACING A LACK OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

An uncontrollable poliarchy

Globalisation is behind the expansion of liberal democracy all over the world. But at the same time: *the model of representative liberal democracy has entered a stage of deep crisis, the origin of which can be traced to the crisis of the traditional Nation-state.* Representative democracy, although it has been a significant conquest in the history of humanity has now turned small. And this is related to the role of the State. And so we find that *the traditional model of a sovereign Nation-state* is giving way and losing importance before the new actors of globalisation.

In the emerging *society network*, states form part of a more complex system in which they live side by side with inter-state organisations, transnational companies, voluntary organisations, social movements, global media groups, etc., which are, moreover, transforming the possibilities of participation, and hence the possibilities too of exercising democratic citizenship.

Power, then, has diversified. And with this democracy transformed into a sort of *poliarchy*, we frequently do not know whom we should demand responsibilities from nor how to exercise an effective control of power. Besides, traditional democratic structures do not turn out adequate enough to control economic and media powers which have become transnational. All this poses new challenges to democracy.

The neoliberal ideological justification

Neoliberal hegemony would get everybody to believe that the only realistic possibility in the present world is that which upholds this policy. And the formula of globalisation, as it exists in its present form, is invoked to justify the status quo and to consolidate in fact giant transnational companies⁴. For this reason it can be affirmed that the process of globalisation is not really a necessary consequence of a technological revolution but should be considered more a manoeuvre on the part of capital to give a reply to the “*crisis of governability*” of the decade of the seventies. It was then that a divorce was produced between the interests of capital and the interests of the Nation-state and the space of politics was dissociated from the space of the economy, the former remaining subordinated and even made a colony of the latter⁵.

To put it in another way: though it is true there is a close relation between globalisation and the progressive weakening of structures and state institutions and that consequently the State can be considered a victim of this process, one must not lose sight of the fact that it has been precisely political power that has opened up the way to companies and dynamic transnational companies.

The growth and conquest of foreign markets is today in the hands of giant companies, linked to the power of powerful states, basically Euro-American. So, state interventions are frequently directed towards favouring the interests of companies against their foreign rivals, whereas selective practices of the free market permit multinationals of powerful countries to get further consolidated. Something so totally contrary to genuine globalisation!

From this perspective, *new technologies work out to be a new tool at the service of Power*, which far from destroying national boundaries, only enhance the imperial reach of hegemonic powers and reinforce the division of the world between imperial and dominated countries, creditors and debtors. And in this context, the USA remains the dominating economic, political and military power in the world and uses its military power to impose its global hegemony. Seen this way, globalisation acquires even more upsetting proportions.

The rise of civil Society

A progressive increase is being produced of the leading role of civil Society on the one hand and on the other the concomitant blurring of the classical distinction between public and private institutions, between State and civil Society.

We must not forget that *the State is a creation of society and has to be at its service*, responding to the wish of those composing society. In this sense, *a vigorous civil Society is the best antidote against political power that exceeds the limits of its functions* and, hence manifests itself to us as a necessary component of democracy. *The capacity to transform reality has its roots in civil Society* which is the real ground of politics.

Made propitious by current neoliberal policies, this leading role of civil Society has enhanced the awareness of the interdependence between spheres and fields of intervention. Consequently, *it works out more and more difficult to maintain the idea of the State as*

guarantee – or at least, as the only guarantee of the general interest, since it is evident that it cannot on its own respond adequately to the new challenges it has to face.

The “third sector”

This rise of civil Society has prompted some people to speak of the *expropriation of state power by civil society* after having lived through stages in which the State was the greatest “expropriator” of social power⁶. In this respect, one should make special mention of the so-called Third Sector, situated between the State and the market, and indispensable for works of social interest. And within this Third Sector NGOs acquire a leading role. Their contribution is principally fourfold⁷:

- a. They come on the international stage as new and influential actors, incorporating a transnational logic, endowed with greater complexity and unpredictability as far as results are concerned.*
- b. They bring along a different form of co-operation, offering an alternative concept of development, that of sustainable development, capable of satisfying the needs of the present without compromising the capacity of future generations to do the same.*
- c. They introduce a new concept of political, participatory and decentralised participation, and are the driving force of social process.*
- d. They revitalise the ethical-civil dimension, opening up new ways to solidarity, a solidarity arising from civic commitment, complementary to administrative solidarity.*

If the advance of civil Society is a clear fact in the bosom of states that are admittedly consolidated democracies, *there is talk today of the emergence of a world civil Society of a transnational nature*, the germinal characteristics of which have manifested themselves in anti-globalisation movements (Seattle, Davos, Prague, Goteborg, Barcelona, Genova, etc.) This world civil society is composed of far-spread-out NGOs (ranging from Greenpeace or A.I. to, for example, WWF-Adena); also forming part of the aforementioned world civil society is the famous new international élite formed by politicians, civil servants, entrepreneurs, executives, experts who operate in the frame of inter-governmental organisations and who have considerable weight in shaping the vision, opinion and decisions of the world.

Global solutions to global problems

Consciousness of inter-dependence has increased. Every day more problems arise of transnational dimensions which demand transnational solutions: climatic changes, migratory fluxes caused by the bad distribution of world wealth, terrorism and international delinquency, market problems that surpass state dimensions, etc. To give an adequate response to this situation, a great number of *transnational organisations* of different natures have sprouted giving rise in this way to *new transnational structures* in the field of economy, production, work, as also in the sphere of different movements like the defence of Human Rights, the fight in favour of the environment, of feminism, pacifism, etc. All these new organisations are shaped not only on the margin of States but *they are characterised by their will to carry out their activity beyond State boundaries, causing the emergence of a new type*

of politics that some call *transnational and poly-centred “sub-politics”* and which breaks political mono-centredness of the traditional state order⁸.

At the present moment then we are witnessing a clear *crisis of territoriality*: the world of globalisation is not only a mosaic of territories, but is also one of networks. The fluxes that arise from many of them transport information and goods and ignore boundaries; *the logic of networks prevails over the logic of territory*.

2. THE SURPASSED NATION-STATE

The crisis of state sovereignty

All this has collaborated to modify substantially one of the fundamental theoretical paradigms on which the power and legitimacy of states were sustained up to now: *sovereignty*. In reality, *we are before a profound crisis of the state model* such as was conceived up to the present moment.

The development of *new forms of political organisation* has brought about the rise of a *multi-lateralised world* in which *power is decentralised and spread out* over different levels of organisation and different transversal centres of decision, all of which interact among themselves and are interwoven to form a jumbled network of corporations and multinational companies, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, social movements, professional associations, etc. These networks reinforce, on the one hand, the capacity of action and the resolution of problems through co-ordinated action, but on the other hand limit the power and capacity of decision of organisations and also of the states themselves. The latter are increasingly conditioned in their decision-taking. As a result, the existence and action of this totality of supra- and infra-state organisations suppose a significant limitation of the possibilities of action of states.

Consequently, *sovereignty, one of the paradigms of the modern state* that converted state power into supreme, exclusive, irresistible and substantive power, the only creator of norms and holder of the monopoly of power of legitimate fiscal coercion within its territory, at the same time the only authorised speaker in foreign affairs, is cracking and this causes the roots to totter on which the classical theory of the State was sustained. On the other hand, *the loss of efficacy of the State has entailed the erosion of its legitimacy before the citizen*. The State offers every day less responses to citizens' demands for security and development.

And although this notion of exclusive sovereignty has always been more a myth than reality, the truth is that *today we are witnessing an important deterioration of the power of the State and of the hierarchical control of the same over other instances*: the exercise of control over its territory and the last word it used to have in political matters have lost much of their efficacy both in its internal dimension as also in its exterior projection.

On the other hand, it is good to put on record the fact that the idea of an exclusive and limitless state power has always been difficult to reconcile with control applied to political

power, and today a limitless state power can only with extreme difficulty exist side by side with the exaltation of personal freedom and autonomy, so typical of present times.

Strategies for State survival

Before this situation, the states of different zones of the planet have tried - and are trying - a *double strategy* (that paradoxically only accelerates the decline of the traditional sovereign nation-State):

a. To incorporate themselves in wider, supra-state units, that accumulate economic, social and military responsibilities ceded to them by the component states.

These *integrated regional units* try to exercise a new type of world governability in certain fields (security, technology, economy...) and count on the support of traditional international organisations.

b. Proceeding to reconvert - or to promote - the State through federalisation or other forms of political decentralisation: with self-government of the integrating parts of the State (federated states, regions, autonomies, etc.), one tries to bring power closer to citizens, *introducing democracy in the sphere of the territorial structuring of the State* and re-valuing sub-state political units. In this way, *political decentralisation* permits “*shared*” *sovereignty* in practice although theoretically the Constitution carries on proclaiming, as in our case, a single sovereignty in the traditional style. Here too the sovereign state shows its insufficiency as it grants insufficient capacity of government to citizens and social or territorially-defined collective groups that do not feel themselves sufficiently recognised or looked after in a structure of power that is too hierarchical, very distant and quite uncontrollable as is the state.

Finally, while perceiving the clear tendency towards the integration of states into supra-state structures, we observe too the appearance of processes that go in the opposite direction, leading to a dispersion of responsibilities and powers among different groups or institutions. The decline of the old political order which was responsible for the division of the world into national states evidences *the need to establish a new world order*.

Fields of transnational action

Numerous are the fields in which the State has ceded positions in favour of the new actors of globalisation. They are all fields which require the adoption of measures that surpass the strict territorial field of the different states, through some type of united effort on a transnational level. Thus:

a) In the economic sphere, growing internationalisation of the economy has made regions increasingly dependent on the international context and less dependent on the state context in which they are set. On the other hand, concepts and criteria used in the definition of national economic policies have lost their traditional meaning before the activity of the WB, IMF, WOC, etc. Although this does not mean that the idea of national economy is already surpassed, since *states do maintain yet a certain autonomy to impose an economic policy of their own design*, it is evident that this situation is provoking a clear *diminution of this autonomy*. The state cannot determine freely its future in this field as it is influenced by the dynamic imposed by the world economy.

The incapacity of states to exercise adequate and effective control of the activity of oligopolies is also a fact. And one must take into account that in the measure in which the sphere of economy does not coincide with the dominion of political authority, political power to control the economy is limited⁹. On the other hand, it is easy today to see how great economic groups have a capacity of financial intervention superior to that of the states themselves.

b) *State power is also seen to be incapable of controlling mass media and information on which public opinion depends.* In a multi-pole, poly-centred world boundaries lose their significance when non-state actors can communicate with each other through space. And one must remember that the control of the media and through them, a control of public opinion has been all along history one of the instruments that has served to sustain state power.

c) *Another parcel on which the State is losing its capacity of action is that of control of organised criminality:* states are becoming more and more incapable of fighting against the big mafias of smuggling, drugs, prostitution, computer science crimes, traffic of weapons, etc. Dark forces, connected with the “black holes” of globalisation, act as extra-parliamentary political powers and circulate through the network. *The same can be said about aspects relating to military technology and world security as also aspects relating to the solution of problems in respect of ecology:* states have difficulty facing realities that defy territory zones and surpass their boundaries.

d) And from the international juridical viewpoint the concept of *humanitarian interference* of states or groups of states within the territorial area of others in order to preserve Human Rights is gaining ground. Also, it is necessary to mention *the creation of an International Penal Tribunal¹⁰* to judge crimes against humanity. This opens the door to extraterritoriality of a certain class of crimes. Nobody using sovereignty of state can now evade justice in cases of serious violation of human rights.

Finally, *sovereignty in the classical sense has ceased to exist.* Now sovereignty in fact is limited, shared or partial, something that is contradictory by definition. The notion of a sovereign nation-State, developed in the XVII and XVIII centuries, has made authentic progress in comparison with the notion of feudalism of the Middle Ages, but acts as a brake in vital issues for the survival of the world. In this sense, *the traditional nation-State*, as Daniel Bell had said some years ago, has turned “*too small for big problems and too big for small problems*”¹¹.

Crisis of traditional citizenship

All this affects the way national identity is built by the State. So, we find that *traditional citizenship which defines a set of rights and reciprocal obligations in the bosom of a nation-state society is questioned by the globalising process and has got “devalued”.*

According to what we have pointed out, nation-States, especially the European ones, have become weakened both by the construction of the European Union in the supranational order as also by the return of infra-state identities. On the other hand, we must keep in mind that *the claims of political autonomy or of independence, founded frequently on popular sovereignty and democracy, undermine in growing fashion the idea of a national homogeneous identity that generally ignores intra-state diversity*, as history demonstrates so abundantly. Besides,

globalisation has added visibility to political action in general and to the treatment granted to national minorities in particular.

To all this we must add the fact that *today there are more and more inhabitants of foreign origin who wish to be citizens “in a different way”, that is to say, to be able to carry on being faithful to a culture or to a nationality of origin, participating at the same time in the society where they have settled down.* This could give rise to immigrants being rejected by important groups of the society that receives them with the consequent strengthening of the identity generated by the State and with the ever-present danger of *outbreaks of racism.*

So, then, both the construction of European policy - in our case - as also the fact of the existence of nations without State within nation-States, who claim their rights, as also the structure of *territorial decentralisations* of a political nature and the presence of foreigners who have become stable and permanent, help to dissociate the existing historical link between nationality (understood as an exclusively political practice). *The emergence of a European identity*, though still feeble and blurred, shows that *the multiplicity of citizenships of a European* is already a fact with the concomitant danger that it could debilitate the loyalty of citizens towards their respective states.

The weakening of politics and the deterioration of the Rule of Law

All these changes are affecting and modifying political structures and processes, transforming possibilities of participation and demanding the putting into practice of new values and principles that are more community- and solidarity-oriented. *New settings of intervention* are being opened up, and with these, new hopes too, for obtaining a more human world. But, at the same time, due to the aspect globalisation has taken under the leadership of neoliberal focuses, we are witnessing a *renunciation of many of the values that precisely define a democratic system* and this even in democratically consolidated states.

It seems we are before a *real agreement* that has resulted in the emergence *and visibility of the state apparatus of violence* which is being put in action in an effort to restrain the protests which an excluding globalisation is causing to emerge. The true face is being shown of power that too often forgets the common good and the real needs of its citizens to bow to economic power and what favours its interests, using for this end the monopoly of repressive force. In this way legitimate violence having been subjected to the laws of the market, *the State is converted into a mere apparatus of security in favour of mega-companies.* On account of this, practically everywhere, the State has become less of a promoter, and hence, *less capable of organising the social bond*; it has been reduced to performing the functions of police of state boundaries, limiting the crossing over of “undesirables” and its work within its own territory is to try to guarantee a certain perpetuation of those who hold political power.

And so, we find today that *the forces of the market show themselves capable of conditioning in a decisive way the decisions of governments considered not only individually but also of international political organisations.* The result is that the geography of social exclusion is extending to sectors and spaces wider every day in the developed world as a consequence of hard economic adjustments, labour precariousness, increase of inequalities and the clear tendency towards social duality, leaving without content the rights of citizens, while huge masses of inhabitants of the countries of the South remain immersed in living conditions that go against the most elementary human rights.

“Megapolitics” globalises national policies, that is to say, subjects them to management that has world interests and whose logic is that of the market, that of profit. With this economist criterion - which turns out criminal given the inequality and injustice it produces - decisions are taken on wars, credits, purchase and sale of goods, diplomatic recognition, commercial blocks, political support, immigration laws, coups d’état, elections, investments, etc.

On the other hand, especially after 9-11, we are witnessing a dangerous and worrisome *authoritarian movement throughout the world* and very specifically in countries of democratic tradition.

Consequently, *Reason of State is made to prevail over Human Rights and the concept of security over that of freedom*. So, we are moving towards police states wishing to solve conflicts by imposing authoritarian order that stems from a false dichotomy between security and Human Rights, the latter seen as an obstacle to obtain security.

The sad thing of all this is that it finds its justification in the desires of citizens themselves, since the fight against insecurity has become an electoral weapon, something that should lead us to reflect seriously on how the democratic ideal can be perverted. It is good to recall here that *it is only under the Rule of Law that democracy can survive* and that, as Benjamin Franklin said in his day “citizens who renounce their freedoms to obtain national security will end up having neither security nor freedom”.

A policy of management devoid of moral connotations

Politics appears today like a secondary activity, subordinated to the demands of the interests of economic power, the true power of our days. This is perceived by citizens as inevitable, since the “*only school of thinking*” does not tire reminding us that political activity is quite inadequate to solve the problems of the contemporary world. Consequently, today “it is the market that governs and the government administers what the market dictates”¹².

In fact, we are witnessing here *the emergence of a true ideology*, that of the *only school of thinking* and the imposition of *the Utopia of the market*, something that is leading transnational corporations to occupy in an almost imperceptible way neuralgic centres of society since laws and constitutions remain unchanged. And all this, behind the backs of democratic powers (Government, Parliament, Juridical power, Public Opinion). So, citizens are referred back to networks and anonymous powers where there are no specific people one can hold responsible for what is being done, because globalisation has diffused and hidden power despite the fact that this continues stronger and more real than ever.

It must be said, nevertheless, that neoliberalism is giving rise to *increasing rejection by the more dynamic and responsible sectors of society*. And so new forms of political responses are appearing which have risen from below, that is, from society itself. Some have defined them as “*sub-politics*” that try to respond to the “*para-politics*” of transnational economic¹³ power and thanks to the appearance of new technologies have more opportunities of making their voice heard and of participating in the organisation of society.

While these *new forms of political action* are being given birth to, traditional politics, that of parties, is losing addicts, putting in crisis essential mechanisms of political participation in representative democracies. *Rapport with politicians has been lost* and these are seen as having lost contact with the daily reality of people and as being incapable apparently of

persevering in what is essential: the real well-being of the community, the well-being of an integrated community, without exclusions.

On account of all this, it has been said that there exists at the present moment and in the face of all this complexity a *real risk of capitulation of the Rule of Law*¹⁴, a risk that not only manifests itself in the internal sphere of each State but also on a global scale, where democratic processes clash with the complexity of functional non-transparent systems which are not easily controllable and capable of being influenced.

In this way, *the Democratic Rule of Law is progressively replaced by a "Rule of Private Law"*¹⁵ reduced to a code of laws which are legitimised by its good functioning, but which are devoid of any moral connotation. So *instrumental rationality* is imposed and *politics becomes management*: politics - and the party - are not valued for their capacity to generate ideals or to act in consequence but for the efficiency and speed with which problems are resolved - or are resolved apparently in a convincing way -, becoming a manager of the "res publica" i.e. "public thing" and not a server of the same.

And given the importance of mass media, behind which are to be found important economic groups, we can say that our democracies have transformed themselves into *mass media democracies that practically reduce democracy to a mere pattern*.

Current democracies lack, then, a moral structure. The values that have been imposed on them are the values of the market, while the model of conduct is that of company strategies that operate for profit, putting aside other values, absolutely indispensable for living together, as are those of gratuity or generosity. So, the only possible policy appears to be that of the logic the economic system affords. And this colonisation of political life by the economy has brought about the situation of *the statute of consumerism (and its logic) triumphing over that of citizens and this has led to the commercialisation of political life which is rendered impossible since the citizen dimension has been eclipsed*. And perhaps one must remember in this respect that *the market, although being the paradigm of freedom produces inequality and does not help to shape the responsible exercise of freedom* offering as it does private instead of public models of discussion and, therefore, preventing us from speaking as citizens about the consequences of our actions in common.

The concept of the "*common good*" no longer exists: today partial and private interests prevail due in great part to the progressive tendency to structure the system of representation of interests through specialised organisations or structured fields of responsibility using sectoral or transnational criteria. This together with the intrinsic complexity of state machinery has helped to weaken the capacity of response of the states vis-à-vis their citizens.

To sum up: weakened in their efficacy, victims of the transversal changes of globalisation and interdependence, States have suffered an important deterioration of their power and capacity of hierarchical control. And because of their incapacity to maintain a certain autonomy with respect to the forces that have arisen or forces that are leading actors of globalisation, States have every day more problems to sustain their legitimacy before citizens who are avid of security and development and who, on the other hand, do not feel themselves sufficiently recognised and looked after in a structure of power that has been overly hierarchised, that is distant and not easily controllable, as is the State.

3. RADICAL DEMOCRACY AND WORLD GOVERNABILITY: A PERSPECTIVE OF THE FUTURE

In reality *what is at stake is democracy itself*: globalisation breaks its natural habitat - a territory circumscribed by boundaries which certain citizens used to live within - at the same time the generation of social exclusion it provokes goes against the very root of all democratic order since it is the negation of citizenship itself. We should not lose sight of the fact that *the process of globalisation underway not only has an economic character but very fundamentally also a political character*, although formally it does not present itself this way. Behind the veil of economics is hidden a very specific political orientation that disguised as a-political pushes citizens towards a world of anonymous networks that escape all control and all democratic logic. This world of networks is dominated by giant transnational companies, administrators of a global economy that tend towards oligopoly in the majority of sectors. These companies, moreover, are openly linked to state power in their task of socialising risk and cost, as also in the repression of what is not “politically correct”¹⁶.

3.1. Preserve democracy...

The survival of democracy requires *democratic policy to exercise control over giant corporations and transnational organisations*, preventing them from seizing a growing private appropriation of state incumbencies. Also, *the need* is increasingly felt *to subordinate technology to democracy so as to avoid its selective and partial use*. *The need* is likewise felt *to have articulating strength for international affairs (relations between states) and for transnational matters*. But *what is really important in the configuration of a new world order is not so much the State as democracy*.

A world so interdependent claims a world democratic order which is a necessary requisite for the economic development of local societies and of their structures of government. Only a world democratic order on account of its inclusive nature will be capable of facing the process of globalisation and will be able to introduce measures that would aim at making available to all people its benefits and opportunities. Because globalisation, as it is being currently developed, generates so many different types of exclusions that instead of making us advance in equity and justice place the planet in a most precarious situation: where excluded people exist, there exists a breeding ground for violence. A “second violence” as we may call it since the first violence is fundamentally structural, the greatest we have in today’s world and responsible for generating what we have just termed “second violence”.

It is totally useless to try to resist the globalising process from the position of the Nation-state since the strength of transnational capital can only be opposed by the strength of a system of government that is likewise transnational and world-wide: it is essential not to leave free scope for non-democratic structures to impose their law and to cause the great social disruption of our times. For this *it is urgently needed to design a new architecture of a democratic nature for global institutions* and to be capable of conceiving a system of equitable sharing of world power that allows the voices of the needy and their representatives

to be heard, protecting the liberty of all, and keeping in mind the environment, sustainability and balance of power relations.

3.2. ...globalising democracy

Our world needs, finally, *a democratic power that is transnational and which is expressed through governability*. Understanding by “governability” something wider than the classical concept of government. It supposes a *capacity TO TAKE DECISIONS, to respond to conflicts and to manage them*. And this should be done with *legitimacy and efficacy*, principles that are interrelated. A legitimacy deriving from the belief in the validity of the political system, a product of reason, and from the good judgement of citizens and efficacy that has justice as its aim and consequence. Only in this way can we speak of *truly human governability*.

But for reasons we have just put forward, *it is not possible to consider democratic development in the global world only and exclusively through states*. Democracy must be extended to the whole lot of entities and transnational, international, supra-state, sub-state and local organisations present in the different scenes of action. Therefore, this transnational democratic system can only be sustained in an effective way through an institutional network, rules of the game that are decided by everybody and applicable without exception to everybody, giving priority to collective groups and nations who are more vulnerable and susceptible of abuses in order that Human Rights can be a reality in all places.

In fact, *a structure is necessary that is capable of covering the activity of states and also that of other intergovernmental organisations (for example, the UN), the NGOs and transnational social movements, enterprises of this type, etc., and in which all social actors can play their role, mutually influencing each other*. And it can easily be deduced that such a complex system that makes possible the assumption of shared responsibilities cannot function with perfect guarantee if it is not rooted in democracy¹⁷.

In a world so plural as the one we live in, it is necessary to have a “*polymorphic*” *democracy that can adopt many ways and forms* and can bring about the convergence of freedom and equality; the convergence of direct and representative democracies; as also a convergence of political democracy, cultural democracy, economic democracy; a convergence too, of real and virtual democracies; in short, a democracy that can achieve the attainment of the greatest amount of freedom and equality with the least amount of coercion¹⁸. A model of global democracy as the one put forward, radical in the sense of going to the root of the human being and to his full achievement by participation, a democracy¹⁹ structured from below upwards would give rise to a new political order that would help to overcome the disintegrating effects of globalisation and would turn passive, consumer-society citizens into constructive ones of democracy, implicating them in the construction of reality.

3.3 To go beyond the liberal paradigm

Globalisation is behind the expansion of liberal democracy all over the world. But it has also made evident the limits of a model - that of representative liberal democracy - which has shown itself clearly insufficient and which has entered a critical stage. *And although modern democracy has been designed to serve and to take advantage of state sovereignty, globalisation, as we have seen, makes national sovereignty more and more less useful*. Today,

we can even say that this principle, more than an ally, is an obstacle to democracy (think of the so-called “humanitarian interference” that is making headway and which questions state sovereignty, or think of the area of crimes such as genocide which override state boundaries and cannot be protected by any “Reason of State”). It becomes necessary then to think about *new and creative formulae* in conformity with the new circumstances.

The hour has arrived *to rethink democracy if we wish to save it*: it cannot be sustained today in the same parameters and premises that it was centuries ago. And at a moment when traditional concepts of Political science, the guarantee of representative democracy, are being systematically emptied of their content, it is indispensable *to shape a new concept of democracy* that will help safeguard legality in the international sphere - not any type of legality, prisoner of the interests of great powers and multinational companies but *a legality based on peace that implies justice in the relations among nations and their governments*. And this justice has to be in the first place *a justice that redistributes wealth between North and South*.

But we cannot remain here: the fight for equality has to be conceived in a broader way; one should take into account the multiplicity of social relations in which inequality is prevalent and so one should take into account *forms of subordination that do not have an exclusively economic nature* (these would include relations between cultures, cultural discriminations and how to combat them). This is an aspect of justice that appears more and more necessary, given the growing multi-cultures of our societies.

It is necessary, then, to be daring and *while maintaining aspects of the liberal paradigm, to go beyond this*, for the simple reason that *the focus of the liberal theory prevents an in-depth understanding of the current situation*. So, for example, transformations produced as a result of the process of globalisation increasingly require an adequate understanding of the way how collective political identities are built. On the other hand, unable to be captured from the individualistic and rationalistic perspective of liberalism are the dynamics of the constitution of collective subjects and the main role passions and antagonisms play in this field. Because in the liberal tradition, as is well known, the sphere of politics is reduced to a neutral field of competing interests, and democracy presupposes single identities since liberalism is monocultural.

From the viewpoint of the liberal paradigm, democracy is conceived as an instrument of optimisation of the capitalistic market. But this way of seeing democracy excludes all forms of political identity other than that of *citizens or groups who are mere agents endowed with egoistic interests and in inevitable conflict among themselves*. A totally insufficient approach if we wish to face new challenges and to assume the cultural pluralism that is being increasingly claimed in the global world²⁰.

It could be said that *we are in a Second Modernity that breaks the reductionist limits of the First Enlightenment* for which “human” was practically the equivalent of European, the political sphere coincided with that of the State and the individual subject corresponded to the citizen. *This Second Modernity that we are living is reflected in a process of transformation of the categories of space and time with which we build our world*. It is the moment *to reconsider how this spatial universality that is surpassing us can be translated legally and politically*.

A radical, participatory and pluralistic paradigm that allows subjects of politics to be accepted as plural identities in their own right and the frame in which they participate needs necessarily to adopt at the same time cultural pluralism in addition to political pluralism. The paradigm should consider that all human identity is compound and hybrid, not single and monolithic.

The ego, instead of being mono-centric and individualistic, is polycentric and interactive. It cannot have, therefore, exclusive and absolute loyalties.

Finally, we need a new paradigm that goes beyond the liberal paradigm to be able *to tackle the topic of world governability from the viewpoint of a conception of democracy that is not circumscribed to state frontiers*; and on the other hand, a paradigm that will help *to rethink and live democracy from the stance of cultural diversity and assume without fear a pluralism that is also cultural besides being ideological*.

3.4. From national democracies to global democracy: a system of “glocal” government

To globalise democracy, making it go beyond the sphere of states is no easy challenge. For this democracy to function adequately, it is indispensable that we establish a division and interconnection of powers, fields of action and responsibilities at different levels. This implies the shaping of a complex structure, based on the logic of the principle of a subsidiary network which permits the distribution not only of fields of action but also of sovereignties among diverse bodies and institutions.

It is evident that for such a framework to function, it is necessary to *delimit scrupulously the scope of decision (sub-state, state, supra-state)*. In fact, to the sub-state sphere should be confided matters whose handling requires a more direct implication of citizens, to the state sphere matters that affect problems and collective issues that surpass the respective territorial fields; finally to the global sphere those topics that need transnational mediation, given the interdependence and intercommunication that exist in today’s world.

Due precisely to this growing interdependence between the different spheres of intervention, *a shared responsibility of a different nature of the actors* is necessary and equally necessary are the possibilities of action of different scope: frequently decisions have to be taken that surpass the local sphere and could even affect the whole of humanity. For this reason, in the group of multiple networks of power that maintain democratic order, the role of organisations and institutions of a nature that is not directly political becomes absolutely fundamental.

For the democratic functioning of this institutional framework in which other social actors are also integrated, it is necessary that it be articulated in a way that produces an interconnection of powers and scopes of action at different levels both horizontally as well as vertically. At each of these levels it should be patent who is the main responsible person since *the principle of responsibility is fundamental in all democratic order*, given that irresponsibility harms everybody, especially the weakest. For this reason, *legal regulations are very important even though they might not be sufficient: one has to make way in the direction of self-regulation and self-limiting of people and collective groups, having as a bench mark the common good of all, without exclusions*.

In this new vertebration of public power, individuals would be members and participate in different communities whose activities affect them. In this way *they could have access to varied forms of participation*. Therefore, *a concept should be established of flexible citizenship, capable of permitting individuals to exercise simultaneously their functions in their capacity of members of various political communities, both global as well as more local*.

We are approaching a new concept of political power, as a much more flexible form of organisation, capable of articulating relations between different levels of power (supra-state,

state, sub-state) which establish pacts in variable forms depending upon the specific interests at each moment and giving leading roles to different types of actors. We have to build a *system of “glocal” government*, in which what is global does not exclude the local, both being different sides of the same coin. It is necessary to submerge oneself in a dialectic process where processes and local experiences (of our environment) are blended with global analyses and incidents. *A power of world reach, if it is to be democratic, has to be decentralised and permeable at the same time, to what is particular of a region.*

With this new structure we are given the opportunity *to recognise diversity and to give the instruments necessary for ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious groups, nations without a State, etc. to have their own sphere of sufficiently representative power.* It is only in this way that a just and full integration of such groups in the new emerging world can be adequately obtained. This would, no doubt, be the best antidote against excluding and sectarian nationalisms and fundamentalisms of all natures. It is in the frame of these new forms of political organisation that the autonomy of certain human collectives can be harmonised with the general interest, and principles of self-determination with sovereignty.

As far as the principle of sovereignty is concerned, it would be good to opt for a redefinition of the same which would permit *passing from the current excluding sovereignty on a territorial basis to an including sovereignty*, based on a pluralistic vision that permits maintaining a compatibility between systems superimposed and in constant inter-action. It is thus we will be building *a world as a home* (a thing, by the way, we could also preach about our closer communities).

3.5. The trap of building an imperial world State

But we must be careful not to fall into the trap of shaping a world imperial State. This would be disastrous. In fact, with globalisation as it functions today from the economic viewpoint and with the *homogenisation made in USA* which is being produced at a cultural level, the political sphere is crucial if we do not wish to play along with imperialism. And this danger, especially after 9-11 is very real.

What we are attempting to achieve is not a type of Supranational State. We are trying to avoid the analogy with the political logic of nation-State, among other things because the logic inherited from the Europe of XVII century (Treaty of Westfalia) has been one of conflict of states and their interests. We cannot forget that one of the consequences of sovereign states is the imperialism of the stronger over the weaker.

Restructuring therefore has to be more profound. In other words, *we cannot reproduce the structures of states on a macro level.* It is not a question of this. It is evident that the creation of a world government without democratic guarantees would be very negative. But there is also danger in creating a world government with characteristics similar to those of current democratic societies, because the world as it is today would be playing along with imperialism. Besides, if one wants to be coherent with democracy, *this new type of world government should not substitute the individual “Reason of State” by another of the universal type, not even in the name of transnational democracy*²¹. The new system of world government *has to be a true political power* and should not, therefore, be a mere League or coalition of states.

3.6. The future of the State...

Everything leads one to believe that we are up against a deep crisis of the state model such as has been conceived up to now, since it has proved to be clearly insufficient to face up to the great challenges that globalisation is posing to us: *we live with forms of political organisation - territorial states - that are quite inadequate to the needs of organisation of contemporary society and also quite inadequate to push forward a more human globalisation.*

The future of traditional nation-States is certainly uncertain. One has to keep in mind that present modern states were in their day a necessary institutional answer to new forms of social organisation that had arisen after the Middle Ages. And in a situation of re-situation similar to that in which we find ourselves currently. *Everything depends on its capacity of adaptation to the new realities.* It is possible - and perhaps desirable - that they continue having a role in the future global order, although, no doubt, they should take a form very different from the current one.

It is certain *the State will lose strength as a structure of sovereignty and as a hierarchical co-ordinator.* The continuance of our placing in the hands of the State the right to declare war or to grant it the right to violate Human Rights is becoming more and more inconceivable. In fact, the nation-State was created to protect Nations, but unfortunately quite frequently it exceeds this frame converting itself more and more into an instrument of slavery of other nations and losing in this way its legitimacy.

In any case, it is difficult to foresee the future that awaits the State. This *would depend on very diverse circumstances*, such as the evolution of the process of globalisation, the different internal and international conditions in which diverse states find themselves and their own capacity of adaptation to the new realities. On the other hand, it must be kept in mind that though the power of states in the new global economy has suffered deep erosion (states no longer have efficient instruments with which to regulate markets or control the flow of money, information or goods), *they still maintain considerable capacity to regulate the more fundamental aspects of the lives of citizens, and consequently, their apparatus carries on exercising great power in relation to domestic issues.*

3.7. ... and the State of the future

Despite all this, one cannot deny that the nation-State *still preserves considerable capacity of symbolical mobilisation*, since it awakens sentiments of collective identification. This explains why states do not like to acknowledge the effective loss of their capacity to act and also the strong desire of certain national communities to obtain their own sovereign nation-State, though it is today more a mobilising myth than an instrument of intervention. On the other hand, at the present moment when we have begun the road towards new forms of organisation on a world scale, *it would not be logical to fail to take advantage of the rich experience and the important advances obtained by states in the field of social integration of individuals and groups.*

What we may venture to advance is that *what will survive of the State will not be precisely its hierarchical capacity to act, but its integrating, negotiating and managing capacity*, which is quite a lot by the way. So, very probably, its main function will consist in granting legitimacy and guaranteeing the responsibility of institutions and political structures both transnational or

supra-state as also sub-state. It is evident that more probably *states will have an important role when it is a question of creating conditions to make international governability effective*, although the epicentre of a new order is not constituted by them but by transnational institutions.

Keeping in mind that *the era of globalisation is also the era of localisation* and consequently, *the era of diversification of power*, it is clear that *states will not be the central or nuclear structure of the new wide and complex world order*. In fact, they are already not so. They have ceded part of this leading role, on the one hand, to transnational (governmental and non-governmental) institutions and agents and on the other, to regions, communities and local entities in the infra-state or inter-state field²². As we have mentioned, the nation-State has ceased being the lead role actor in the global world and has had to share its capacity of decision with other actors and instances of a transnational nature.

It seems, then, that states *should evolve towards more flexible models, capable of integrating plurality in its bosom and at the same time, of living side-by-side and interacting with outside plurality*. Very probably they will be *states with shared sovereignty and responsibilities, flexible and inter-connected among themselves; they would be successive and spaced out, depending upon needs and appropriate levels, according to the principle of active “subsidiarity” which would permit passing from local levels to the world level when needed*.

3.8. Re-thinking citizenship: the challenge of living plural identities and shared loyalties

In the light of what we have said, it becomes necessary *to look for a new paradigm* that is being increasingly claimed by more and more plural and interdependent societies and by individuals of more hybrid identities. A paradigm that could be *useful to face the identity of a poly-convergent individual self, moulded under the influence both of individual autonomy as also inter-dependence; and also to face the identities of national communities built heterogeneously, integrated in supranational spaces*.

We must keep in mind that *citizenship is not another essence but a social construction*. So, in the face of societies that each day are more plural in nature and in which recognition of diversity is inherent to pluralism itself, *the necessity of re-thinking citizenship from the angle of identity and justice* is patently obvious. We need to advance in this direction towards a *concept of citizenship that unites the rationality (universal) of justice and its demands with the sentiment of belonging to a Community and participation in its construction*²³. In fact, as individuals we should be capable of assuming citizenship, taking charge of injustices within and without the political Community itself and accepting responsibility itself in order to articulate from the position of responsibility and with the necessary political mediations, an *efficacious exercise of solidarity*.

And we can see today the usefulness of opting for an *open and flexible citizenship that transcends diversities and offers spaces for dialogue and understanding; a citizenship that encourages a democracy of diversity*. And this, keeping in mind that *we can only live as citizens of the world if on closer levels we have lived the sense of belonging to a Community and we have been involved in its construction*. You cannot aspire to being part of globality if before you do not “exist”. And you always “exist” in relation to a group which confers identity on you. It is necessary *to live the healthy tension between identity and globality, and*

also to remember that in order for there to be intercultural dialogue and respect for differences, there has to be recognition of the right to “exist”, of the right to have one’s own identity. Therefore, to speak of cosmopolitanism does in no way mean to be of no place. It is a dangerous illusion to imagine the possibility of cosmopolitan citizenship based exclusively on an abstract idea of humanity: a democratic government requires the existence of smaller units in which popular sovereignty can be exercised.

It would be necessary, then, to advance towards a concept of citizenship that breaks the bipolar logic that sets in opposition universal and individual identity (making the former subordinate or annul the latter), or which confronts freedom with loyalty, the individual with the community, rationality with identity. All these are possible in a hybrid, complex, flexible identity that shelters them.

We need urgently to advance towards a different concept of democratic citizenship that does not bring about homogeneity, a different concept of how to deal with discrimination. In this sense one must bear in mind that the concept of classical citizenship is linked to the idea of equality that is based on the principle of universality (peculiarities were contemplated by modernity as forms of discrimination). But it is precisely these policies of universalism, derived from the modern conception of citizenship and put forward by the traditional nation-State that are today in crisis, since what is currently claimed are policies of difference denominated too as policies of recognition.

And, while the policies of universalism placed emphasis on the equality of dignity and rights of all citizens, the policies of difference claim - without this denying the aforesaid - the differential recognition of the identity of each citizen, group, culture, nation. In this way, equality today requires affirmation rather than the ignoring of group differences, avoiding, however, discrimination. And the system of rights should not only take into consideration the inequality of the material conditions of life, but also cultural differences and the treatment they receive, because here too justice is involved.

From all this stems the possibility of a citizenship with multiple, complex, complementary and shared loyalties, a cosmopolitan citizenship in the European and world ambits, plurinational in the state sphere and multicultural in the national sphere, being the last the fundamental loyalty, lived always from the angle of non-exclusion of people considered individually or as members of collective groups. Because we can belong to different places and communities at the same time and for this reason we can speak of multiple belongings. And multiple belongings lead to more flexible relations and while generating more complex forms of identity, give rise to formulas of reception and integration of the other, reconciling different traditions. It is possible in this way to recognise pluralism and diversity, heterogeneity and difference and a multiplicity of sovereignties without there being conflicts of loyalty²⁴. This is the great challenge of the XXI century if we really wish to have a world in peace.

4. A COMPROMISE FOR THE DEMOCRATISATION OF SOCIETY

All that we have said is still not sufficient to govern globalisation and make it more human. Because *democracy cannot be reduced to a set of institutions and procedures and to a simple formal legitimacy. It implies in addition values, principles, targets, objectives* aimed at satisfying the needs and aspirations of citizens and at promoting the conditions to achieve effectively freedom and equality of individuals and groups of people and must look after especially the most vulnerable. And all this needs to be done *under the least pressure possible*.

To speak, then, of values, principles, etc. amounts to saying that *human governability should not limit itself to shaping the basic institutional frame of living together but that it should also concern itself with helping to obtain an effective democratisation of individual civil societies and of the global civil Society which is emerging. The democratisation of civil Society should be considered an unavoidable premise for the existence not only of a democratic State but also of a system of world government and at the same time, the driving force of its democratisation*.

4.1. Democratic institutions alone are not sufficient

It is evident that democracy cannot be reduced to the creation and functioning of public institutions. It is necessary *to recover democratic ethics* and this affects not only citizens considered individually but also different groups of people that go to form the civil Society of different states. Consequently, democracy should be extended to the whole varied set of entities and organisations that form the said society and, in addition, should take root in the practices and the way of proceeding of citizens. And in this sense, there is an urgent need *to introduce moral criteria in society* in order that it is not moved by individualistic criteria, but that society should take into account solidarity, justice and the acceptance of diversity, that is to say, social criteria.

Because, governments and democratic societies, both at individual and global levels are incompatible with the existence of powerful groups or corporate organisations capable of systematically distorting democratic processes and decision-taking, conditioning thus the political agenda. They are also totally *incompatible with apathetic and individualistic citizens who live their lives in the cult of comfort, shut away in their private lives and totally uninvolved in public matters*. Democracy does not depend alone on the activity of governments and political parties, but also, and primarily, on the capacity of civil Society to overcome individualism and even to act as a counter-power, should the need arise.

So, many problems of the present world cannot be changed from the position of power, since they have a very strong cultural dimension and they need, therefore, the consent of an important part of the population. For this reason it is so important *to help vertebrate associatively the social fabric*, favouring the *development of transnational associations of citizens* in matters like Human Rights, environment, peace, etc. It is only in this way that democracy can take root and become *a live and substantial democracy*.

It is not sufficient to build a world democratic structure. It is necessary to structure an *international Community* with a democratic *world civil Society*.

And, in respect of relations between states, all this goes beyond the creation of international juridical norms and procedures: one has to *pass from International Society, based on the logic of states and their interests, to the International Community which regards the whole of humanity as their subjects and is concerned with the good of all humanity*. This is a question that runs parallel to the claim of the so-called *rights of the third generation*, among them the right to peace and to sustainable development. And *this cannot be made reality if we do not re-consider in depth the economic model itself*, since production, distribution and the tapping of resources should also be compatible with the democratic process.

So, *it is necessary to go further than both models* and to consider what Diego Gracia calls “a real state, based on real democracy”²⁵. On the other hand, we cannot elude a paradox that is at the very root of representative democracy: *it is the model itself that generates and sustains the lack of interest of citizens in the public field*. It is a question of *a system incapable of producing sociality, of building a social community, which is the raw material of politics*. So, we are turned into consumers of democracy instead of citizens who build democracy. And a consumer is faithful to the system only inasmuch as it gives him benefits.

In the frame of globalisation, more than commutative or distributive justice we need to *make a bid for social justice based on equality and the brotherhood of all human beings and on the universality of their essential rights*²⁶, that is to say, *a justice which presupposes the fulfilment of Human Rights of the third generation*, which requires us to live and think in a different way and which has *solidarity as its key value*. We need then from this perspective *to begin to re-consider the legitimacy of democratic systems and to dare to affirm that none of them is legitimate unless it is capable of keeping in mind the interests of all those who are affected by it*.

As we said in the presentation, *the great revolution that we have pending is the “cultural revolution”*, a revolution in the values that shape our lifestyles. *There will be no possibility of any significant transformation unless based on a previous cultural transformation*²⁷ that not only favours *social implication* and participation but also favours co-existence in the frame of multicultural societies.

Consequently there will have to exist *a transformation that accepts diversity and helps to articulate flexible identities and build common imaginary objectives*.

This is indispensable to be able to set up a “*glocal*” system whereby there could be government from different centres of power with shared responsibilities, that is to say, with co-responsibility. This system will only be viable if *we all proceed to reconstructing democracy from sub-state levels, places that are, moreover, more conducive for the reconstruction of the political subject and for strengthening a substantial, vital democracy*. Because this can only grow and be strengthened when it comes *from an internal commitment to the collective group*.

Without living this “otherness”, democracy is not possible.

We need then a project of radical transformation, both political and cultural, of society as a whole. And also of the economic system, the generator of values that often goes contrary to what we need to accomplish this project. And we must understand that *democracy should not be imposed in a uniform way* in all political communities of the world since democracy is accessed to by a *process* that by its very nature implies “*gradualness*” and can produce different results too.

4.2. Democracy is more important than the State

We are in a *stage of transition towards new forms of organisation on a world scale* and we must be aware that in the shaping of the new world order *democracy plays a more important role than the State*, although in point of fact this is often the opposite. Globalisation of the market and of information technologies should be accompanied by a *political, ethical and social globalisation, in which democratic values play a clear leading role*. This is the only way if we wish globalisation to benefit all not merely quantitatively but basically qualitatively: a globalisation that can be assumed as a *new way of "being" in the world* and which implies, consequently new lifestyles.

This could be dubbed as Utopian. We should avoid being naïve to think that this is easy. But what is certain is that *we cannot continue much longer in the irrational situation our world is living in*. And the present moment is offering us a *historic opportunity: to see and shape our world in a less short-sighted, reductionist and excluding way than we have been doing so up to now*.

Globalisation helps us not only by the fact of making it evident to us how *interdependent* we are on one another but also it is bringing home the pluralism of diversity. *To re-think democracy at this historic moment it is necessary to do so from the angle of pluralism that presents two aspects: the plurality of actors that have to converge for world governability, over-riding boundaries of states, and the plurality of cultures that requires us to live in freedom at the service of social inclusion and in equality at the service of difference*. And this clearly entails going much further than the model of liberal representative democracy.

Let us be courageous and hopeful then before a future, the moulding of which rests, in large measure, in our hands.

NOTES

1. So, it would be necessary to set out four new social contracts (MAYOR ZARAGOZA, Federico; BINDÉ, Jérôme, *Un món nou*, Centre UNESCO de Catalunya, Barcelona 2000, pg. 27 ss), pillars of a new international democracy: a social contract to eradicate poverty, a natural contract to preserve the environment, a cultural contract to obtain education for everybody throughout life, and an ethical contract that would give meaning and perspective to the human adventure.
2. COMÍN, Antoni, *Mounier: de todos no, de nadie*, in El Ciervo, Barcelona 2000, pg. 18; and of the same autor, *Tres variacions sobre un tema de Mounier: Teologia, Filosofia política, Economia*, Butlletí del Col·legi Oficial de Doctors i Llicenciats en Filosofia i Lletres i en Ciències de Catalunya, n.7, Barcelona, otoño 2002.
3. OLLER, Dolors, *Ante una democracia de baja intensidad*, Cuadernos CJ, n. 56, Barcelona 1994.
4. In this sense, MOUFFE, Chantal, *Globalització i ciutadania democràtica*, Idees, n.8, pg. 143.
5. GORZ, André, *Misères du présent, richesse du possible*, París, Galilée, 1997, citat per MOUFFE, Chantal, art. cit. p.143-144.
6. In this sense, GARCÍA-PELAYO, Manuel, *Idea de la política y otros escritos*, CEC, Madrid 1983, pg. 133.
7. CASTIÑEIRA, Ángel, *Los Inuevos caminos de la solidaridad internacional. El papel de las ONG*, Anuario estadístico Universal Deusto – ESADE, pg. 122-126.
8. JÁUREGUI, Gurutz, *La democracia planetaria*, Ediciones Nobel, Oviedo 2000, pg. 60.
9. Let us recall that the level of state territory was, only half a century ago, that of the so-called “national” economy and that one of the fundamental pillars of the power of the modern capitalist state has been the national market.
10. Founded on July 17, 1998 in Rome, it came into force on July 1, 2002 despite the fact that its Treaty of creation has not been ratified by certain important countries such as the United States, China or India, the majority of the Arab countries and Israel, a circumstance that endangers its viability.
11. Quoted by MÀRIA, Joseph F., *La Globalización*, pg. 54.
12. ESTEFANÍA, Joaquín, *Contra el pensamiento único*, Taurus, Madrid 1997, pg. 26.
13. JÁUREGUI, Gurutz, op.cit. pg. 54.
14. HABERMAS, Jürgen, *Más allá del Estado nacional*, Trotta, Madrid 1997, pg. 146.
15. Terminology used by JÁUREGUI, Gurutz, op.cit. pg. 54.
16. CHOMSKY, Noam, *El control de nuestras vidas*, Conference given on February 20, 2000 in Kiva Auditorium, Albuquerque, New México, www.cgt.es/biblioteca.html.
17. According to BECK, Ulrich, *¿Qué es la globalización?*, Paidés, Barcelona 1998, there are three possible models: 1) The politico-realist model, focused on states and their sovereignty; this implies an international policy based not on moral considerations but on geo-political interests and interests of relations of power. 2) The internationalist model with states as the essential key actors but who allow themselves to be influenced by international organisations whose consensus they seek, especially in respect of Human Rights, although they could, if necessary, impose their criterion. 3) The model of *cosmopolitan democracy* of David Held (HELD, David, *Democracy and the Global Order*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1995, 271-273), that supposes a reformulation of the Kantian idea of a cosmopolitan order, appropriate to the new world situation and which aims at a parallel development of democracy both on an internal and international scale.

18. BILBENY, Norbert, *Democracia para la diversidad*, Ariel, Barcelona 1999, pg. 131.
19. CORTINA, Adela, *Sociedad civil y democracia radical*, en ZAMORA, José A. (coord.) *Radicalizar la democracia*, Foro “Ignacio Ellacuría – solidaridad y cristianismo”, Verbo Divino, Estella 2001, pg. 19 ss.
20. In this sense, BILBENY, Norbert, op.cit. pg. 123-131.
21. BILBENY, Norbert, op.cit. pg. 138.
22. For Castells, states will constitute the basic institutional structure of a new political order, converting themselves in this way into parts of a broader network in which they would share functions both in internal as well as external spheres. (Manuel CASTELLS, *La era de la Información, Economía, sociedad y cultura*, Vol. 2. “El poder de la identidad”, Alianza, Madrid 1998, pg. 334).
23. CORTINA, Adela, *Ciudadanía social y multicultural*, in TEZANOS, José F. (ed.), “La democracia post-liberal”, Ed. Sistema, Madrid 1996, pg. 131-143.
24. See in this sense, CASTIÑEIRA, Ángel, *Ciudadanía e identidad en el contexto de la globalización*, in Frontera, Pastoral misionera nº 17, Valencia, January-March 2001, pg. 35-49.
25. GRACIA, Diego, *Introducción a la bioética*, El Búho, Bogotá 1991, pg. 55; quoted by ARANGUREN GONZALO, Luis Alfonso, *Educación en la intervención de la solidaridad*, Cuadernos Bakeaz, nº 22, Bilbao 1997, pg. 11.
26. Cfr. SEBASTIÁN, Luis de, *La solidaridad*, Ariel, Barcelona 1996, pg. 22-23.
27. ZUBERO, Imanol, *Movimientos sociales y alternativas de sociedad*, en ZAMORA, José A. (coord.), op.cit. pg. 99.